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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
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Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV): Front-End Approaches 
to Achieve Reduction in Total Ownership Cost 
Presenter:  Michael Boudreau, Colonel, US Army (Ret), has been a senior lecturer at 
the Naval Postgraduate School since 1995.  While an active duty Army Officer, he was the 
Project Manager, Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles, 1992-1995.  He commanded the Materiel 
Support Center, Korea, 1989-1991 and the Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant, 1982-1984.  COL 
Boudreau is a graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces; Defense Systems 
Management College; Army Command and General Staff College; Long Armour-Infantry 
Course, Royal Armoured Corps Centre, United Kingdom; and Ordnance Officer Basic and 
Advanced courses.  He holds a Bachelor of Mechanical Engineering degree and Master of 




During the latter half of the 1980s and throughout much of the 1990s, budget constraints 
were increasingly tight, resulting in Defense budget reductions (measured in constant dollars); 
these reductions commenced in FY 1986 and extended through FY 1997—the only increase 
being FY 1991, corresponding to Operation Desert Storm. In an attempt to squeeze every 
penny from required resources, DoD leadership emphasized the necessity of controlling cost of 
new warfighting systems—not only the cost of development and production, but also the cost of 
sustainment.  In 1995, Dr. Paul Kaminski, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and 
Technology (USDA&T), introduced the term “cost as in independent variable (CAIV),” in 
recognition that resources were tight and that weapon system costs—lifecycle costs—would 
have to be managed and controlled through tradeoffs that occur during the developmental 
process. 
As one who is familiar with policy change in the DoD might expect, decisive change did 
not result immediately.  Nevertheless, a group of Pilot programs were identified within each 
Service that would provide lessons for Reduction in Total Ownership Cost (R-TOC).   
Furthermore, a relevant series of OSD and CJCS regulatory changes were published in 
2003 and 2004, which were intended to Support CAIV and contribute to R-TOC.  Now, it seems, 
is the time to gauge emerging changes. This research effort proceeds by seeking answers to 
the following questions:   
• Has the DoD put into place policy and implemented guidance to support CAIV as a 
practice in the acquisition of the DoD’s warfighting systems? 
• Has the DoD established the necessary processes and tools to monitor and control 
CAIV? 
• Has DoD leadership exhibited the will and determination to control Total Ownership 
Costs of its warfighting systems? 
• In the meantime, has the focus on CAIV and Reduction in Total Ownership Cost 
somehow changed? 
Using Data available from a variety of DoD sources and interviews with DoD personnel 
participants, this paper highlights changes in policy, process, and practice aimed at reducing 
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system lifecycle cost.  The paper will point out new or remaining obstacles to the application of 
Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) and Reduction in Total Ownership Cost (R-TOC). The 
focus is the “front end” of the process—that is, we will examine practices during Concept 
Refinement, Technology Development, associated JROC reviews, and acquisition Milestones A 
& B.  
A. Has the DoD put into place policy and implementing guidance to practice CAIV in the 
acquisition of DoD’s warfighting systems? 
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD 
(AT&L)) published new acquisition policy and guidance, beginning on 12 May 2003 with 
publication of DoD 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, and continuing with DoDI 5000.2, 
Operating the Defense Acquisition System.  The companion Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 
containing discretionary best practices, was placed on-line in the fall of 2004.   
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff first published CJCS Instruction 3170.01D, 
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) and the accompanying CJCS 
Manual 3170.01A, Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System in 
June 2003 and then updated both directives on 12 March 2004.   
In combination, these directives, together with the on-line Guidebook, address the 
requirement of affordability analysis and attention to Total Ownership Cost or system lifecycle 
cost during the following processes: Concept Refinement, Technology Development (in such 
activities as preparation of the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD)), conducting the Analysis of 
Alternatives (AOA), writing the Capability Development Document (CDD), progressing through 
JCIDS reviews, and preparing for acquisition Milestones A & B.  Collectively, these regulations 
influence the work of sponsors, users, developers, staff overseers, leaders, and decision 
makers. 
B. Has DoD established the processes and tools to monitor and control CAIV? 
The R-TOC Pilots—The R-TOC Pilot programs have yielded numerous processes that 
are useful to control lifecycle cost.  Many lessons have been reported from this effort, which 
began in October 1999.  Additionally, the need for improved cost databases and cost estimating 
tools has resulted in numerous initiatives in each of the Services and with defense contractors.  
Unfortunately, the R-TOC pilots currently do not include any programs that are early in their 
developmental cycle: that is, prior to Milestone B.  There are obvious, prominent choices for 
designation as CAIV pilot programs in each of the Services that might yield valuable lessons-
learned for the acquisition community.  Without CAIV pilot programs, the DoD may lose valuable 
lessons which would add to the difficulty of determining whether current guidance provides the 
desired benefits during pre-acquisition and the early development of new warfighting systems. 
C. Has the DoD leadership exhibited the will and determination to control Total 
Ownership Costs of its warfighting systems? 
In general, there is considerable pressure on programs to prepare early cost 
information.  In some instances, the pressure has been intensified through the use of Key 
Performance Parameters (KPP) written by the sponsors or users into requirements (ORD) or 
capability documents (CDD).  Additionally, there is indication of at least one program specifying 
early cost targets in its acquisition strategy document. 
 =
=
===================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=íÜÉ=ÑçìåÇ~íáçå=Ñçê=áååçî~íáçå======== - 426 - 
=
=
JROC emphasis on TOC has the latitude to question cost or affordability, but the role of 
the JROC is reportedly more focused on other issues (such as interoperability and joint use), 
and less concerned about cost.  The JROC’s lack of emphasis on affordability seems to be an 
opportunity lost, wherein users might be more strongly encouraged to take an active interest in 
setting ownership cost targets.   
Milestone Decision Authority emphasis on Cost—For various reasons, acquisition 
milestone decision points may offer a better opportunity than the JROC process to address and 
influence warfighting system cost.  Much of the pressure on cost comes from required 
independent cost estimates (ICE) that precede milestone reviews. 
Service leaders (within and outside acquisition) may be reluctant to demand lifecycle 
cost targets leading into system development, out of concern that incorrectly specified cost 
targets could increase program risk from “outside.” Such an error could result in unfavorable 
attention to a critically needed warfighting system, possibly resulting in its termination. 
Service leaders also may lack confidence in lifecycle cost estimates until systems have 
been sufficiently tested and are poised for production and fielding. 
D. In the meantime, has the focus on CAIV and Reduction in Total Ownership Cost 
somehow changed? 
Sec. 811. Rapid Acquisition Authority to Respond to Combat Emergencies—This 
law provides for relief from applicable law and regulation in acquiring critical materiel where 
combat fatalities have occurred. 
In a wartime environment, when US Armed Forces personnel are operating in harm’s 
way, TOC necessarily should become secondary to safety and survivability.  An obvious 
example, up-armoring HMMWVs and other trucks in Iraq, illustrates the point.  An obvious 
outcome of up-armoring vehicles, albeit one that seems to attract little notice, is the armoring’s 
significant impact on O&S costs—system lifecycle cost. 
Other Changes in Focus.  Two other major acquisition initiatives may increase 
pressure on TOC and possibly compete against CAIV during the “front-end” analysis of an 
emerging warfighting system.  The first is spiral development, which almost assuredly adds 
logistical burdens to the acquisition process.  The other is the possibility of cost errors during the 
Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) determination—resulting in out-sourced logistics that are 
more expensive than estimated.  Both spiral development and PBL have potential effects on 
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